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ABSTRACT 
 Recent events are replete with stories of fraudulent or opportunistic 
behavior in the initial public offering (IPO) process—behavior that ex-
tended to the highest-reputation investment banks. Curiously, not-
withstanding this evidence, recent financial economics literature as-
serts investment bank conflicts of interest “certify” IPO issuers. 
 This Article develops new empirical evidence that casts doubt on 
this “certification” hypothesis by examining the pre-IPO price adjust-
ment of IPOs involving qualified independent underwriters (QIUs), 
particularly IPOs in which more than ten percent of the net proceeds 
are being directed to participating investment banks (for example, to 
repay a prior extension of credit). These offerings have similar pre-
IPO-pricing patterns to those others interpret as involving certifica-
tion. Investment bank exit, however, cannot comfortably be catego-
rized as certification. These results, together with other recent results 
in the legal literature, support the view that factors other than “certi-
fication” account for IPO-pricing phenomena in IPOs involving in-
vestment bank conflicts of interest. 
 The SEC is finally considering important proposals put forward by 
the NASD and the NYSE to reform IPO marketing, albeit five years 
after the internet bubble in IPOs and other securities transactions 
burst. These results support increased disclosure-focused regulation of 
the IPO process. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Five years after the internet bubble in initial public offerings 
(IPOs)1 and other securities transactions burst,2 the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is finally considering important pro-
posals to reform IPO marketing.3 The proposals, put forward by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the New 
York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE), in part seek to restrain opportun-
istic IPO pricing by investment banks that would disadvantage issu-
ers. 
 Recent events are replete with stories of fraudulent or opportunis-
tic behavior in the IPO-pricing process, which extended to the high-
est-reputation investment banks. Credit Suisse First Boston and 
Morgan Stanley, among others, settled administrative charges that 
essentially involved charging issuers hidden fees. The charges were 
collected by placing hot IPOs with investors who returned the “favor” 
by paying above-market prices in other transactions.4 This kind of 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Hirschkorn, 2000 Year-in-Review: Dashed Dreams, Crumbling 
Fortunes, http://www.ipomonitor.com/reviews/2000 (“The 2000 IPO market was a year of 
extremes, beginning in a frenzy and ending in a collapse.”). 
 2. The NASDAQ composite stock index closed on January 3, 2000, at 4131.15, 
reached 5048.62 at close on March 10, 2000, and opened on January 2, 2001, at 2474.16. 
Yahoo! Finance Historical Prices for NASDAQ Composite, http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
q/hp?s=%5EIXIC (enter dates in “Set Date Range”; then follow “Get Prices”) (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2005). 
 3. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Extension of the Comment Period for the 
Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Prohibition of Certain Abuses in the Alloca-
tion and Distribution of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 
51,039, 70 Fed. Reg. 3415 (Jan. 24, 2005) (extending the public comment period until Feb-
ruary 15, 2005); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes 
by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. Relating to the Prohibition of Certain Abuses in the Allocation and Distribution of 
Shares in Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”), Exchange Act Release No. 50,896, 69 Fed. Reg. 
77,804 (Dec. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 50,896]. 
 4. See SEC Sues CSFB for IPO Violations; CSFB Will Pay $100 Million, SEC Litiga-
tion Release No. 17,327 (Jan. 22, 2002) (announcing settlement, without admission or de-
nial, of allegations that Credit Suisse First Boston allocated IPO shares to investors “will-
ing to funnel between 33 and 65 percent of their IPO profits to CSFB . . . [i]n the form of 
excessive brokerage commissions”); Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley Settle 
NASD IPO Charges, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 947 (May 24, 2004) (discussing settle-
ment of NASD charges, without admission or denial, involving allegations very high com-
missions were paid to the investment banks in exchange for allocations of IPO shares). See 
generally EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 777 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004) (reversing dismissal of claims alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and 
affirming denial of claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty against lead manager). The fidu-
ciary claim alleged that the underwriter:  
[U]nderpriced plaintiff’s shares in order to reap an additional profit, beyond the 
amount realized on the spread between the price of its own subscription and 
the higher public offering price, when it ‘flipped’ its shares in the balloon-priced 
aftermarket, and that such underpricing was also the consideration given for 
‘kickbacks’ from defendant’s favored customers, to whom defendant had allo-
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activity deceives investors who buy without knowing the full extent 
of the brokers’ compensation, and it is deceitful to issuers who, when 
the underwriters are engaged, are unaware of the full extent of the 
underwriters’ compensation. A second type of allegation involves un-
derwriters who condition IPO allocations on investors agreeing to 
purchase in the aftermarket. Not disclosing such information renders 
the prospectus description of the plan of distribution misleading. 
Goldman Sachs, for example, agreed to settle for $40 million on alle-
gations that it improperly considered investors’ post-IPO aftermarket 
purchases in determining initial IPO allocations.5 A third set of alle-
gations involves claims that hot IPOs were allocated to the individual 
accounts of corporate executives to facilitate the investors steering 
corporate business to the investment banks allocating hot IPOs.6 
 Current financial economics scholarship strikes a note that is dis-
cordant with this evidence of widespread investment bank malfea-
sance. Professors Li and Masulis, empirically examining a set of 1480 
IPOs, assert that they find support for what they call the “certifica-
tion hypothesis.”7 In their words, the certification hypothesis pro-
vides: “[U]nderwriters with superior access to issuer information can 
credibly validate issuer financial health, thereby increasing investor 
demand and supporting higher security offer prices . . . .”8 The Li and 
Masulis certification hypothesis in fact contains two separate hy-
potheses: (1) some underwriter relationships with issuers may give 
the underwriters better access to information, and (2) some set of 
underwriter affiliations may provide some assurance of the value of 
the investment, supporting greater prices. 
                                                                                                                      
cated shares in the IPO that were also flipped in the aftermarket, disguised as 
commissions on unrelated transactions. 
Id. at 442-43. 
 5. SEC Sues Goldman Sachs & Co. for IPO Violations; Goldman Sachs Will Pay $40 
Million, SEC Litigation Release No. 19,051, (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/lr19051.htm. 
 6. This was one of the allegations against ten major investment banks that were set-
tled in the $1.4 billion Global Research Analyst Settlement with, inter alia, the SEC and the 
New York Attorney General’s office. Press Release, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, 
NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment 
Practices (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm; Complaint at ¶ 142, 
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2945 (WHP), (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003); Com-
plaint at ¶ 7, SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, No. 03 Civ. 2946 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
28, 2003). This list of malfeasance in the IPO process is meant to be illustrative, not exhaus-
tive. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Sub, Formerly Spear Leeds, Settles NASD Allegations of Hid-
ing IPO Sales, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Mar. 23, 2005), WL 3/23/2005 SLD d17 (discussing the $1 
million settlement by a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs of NASD charges that the subsidiary 
violated NASD rules by taking actions that concealed from market participants resales of 
IPO securities). 
 7. Xi Li & Ronald W. Masulis, Venture Capital Investments by IPO Underwriters: 
Certification, Alignment of Interest, or Moral Hazard? 21 (Dec. 29, 2004) (unpublished 
working paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=559105. 
 8. Id. at 2. 
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 One of the statistics Li and Masulis examine to support this hy-
pothesis is the absolute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment. Some 
background of the IPO pricing process, which is detailed in Part II, is 
required to understand precisely what that statistic is. For the mo-
ment, however, it is sufficient to note that the IPO process in the 
United States ultimately results in the public dissemination of a pre-
liminary price estimate for each IPO as well as the actual IPO 
price—the pre-IPO price adjustment being the actual price minus 
that estimate. Li and Masulis find a negative relationship between 
the absolute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment and the percent-
age beneficial ownership of the issuer by investment banks partici-
pating in the IPO. On the basis of this and other evidence, they as-
sert these investments certify issuers and allow underwriters to 
make better pre-IPO price estimates.9 
 The problem with their analysis is that the relationship they in-
vestigate may well involve the first kind of certification—allowing 
better access to information—but not involve the second kind—
providing assurance of value. A seller’s superior access to informa-
tion does not necessarily mean the seller assures value. Superior ac-
cess to information may be used to select items for sale that can be 
sold at prices higher than those that would be supported if the pri-
vate information were public. That is, it may be the investment 
banks know more and now are trying to sell off assets identified as 
lemons, a situation comparable to a used car dealer selling his per-
sonal car.  
 The primary contribution of this Article is to rebut their conclu-
sion as to the second component of certification, as part of providing 
better evidence concerning IPO pricing—evidence that is pertinent to 
addressing proposed regulatory reform. Li and Masulis find a nega-
tive relationship between the absolute value of the pre-IPO price ad-
justment and the percentage beneficial ownership of the issuer by in-
vestment banks participating in the IPO.10 In their view, lower abso-
lute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment for some set of IPOs is 
consistent with “certification,” that is, assurance of value.11 This Ar-
ticle rebuts that conclusion by examining IPOs where the issuer uses 
a significant portion of the IPO proceeds to pay off participating in-
vestment banks (or their affiliates or associates); that is, the IPO is 
bailing out those investment banks.12 An analysis of the pre-IPO 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Id. at 21. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. There are also a few more technical concerns with Li and Masulis’s investigation. 
First, they take percentage ownership from prospectuses. Id. at 9. The prospectus disclo-
sure addresses the level of control; it is not based on financial interest. 17 C.F.R. §§ 
228.403 instruction 4, 229.403 instruction 2, 240.13d-3 (2005). An investment bank affili-
2005]                          IPO-PRICING REGULATION 441 
 
price adjustment in 1168 IPOs from 1997 through 2000 is reported in 
Part V. That analysis shows IPOs involving this kind of investment 
bank exit involve a pre-IPO price adjustment pattern similar to that 
which Li and Masulis categorize as consistent with assurance of 
value. However, investment bank exit is not easily categorized as re-
flecting investment bank assurance of value. In sum, the relationship 
they identify also exists in cases that are not easily categorized as in-
volving certification, which challenges their conclusions. 
 In addition to demonstrating that certain pre-IPO-pricing rela-
tionships cannot be uniquely ascribed to certification, it would be 
helpful to provide for regulators a comprehensive, compact, and ac-
curate theory of IPO pricing—a substitute for the certification hy-
pothesis. This Article, however, forgoes attempting to provide such a 
comprehensive model. As noted above,13 there is little question that 
the IPO market has been affected by deceitful and manipulative con-
duct, which creates substantial roadblocks to the formulation of an 
accurate, elegant model. 
II.   THE MECHANICS OF IPO MARKETING AND PRICING 
A.   IPO-Pricing Mechanics 
 Some background information concerning the IPO-pricing process 
and its regulation is required to understand the way in which one 
can examine empirically the competing theories of IPO pricing. In 
the United States, most IPOs are sold on a “firm commitment” basis14 
in which the issuer formally sells the securities to one or more in-
vestment banks (a group of two or more investment banks acting in 
this capacity being called a “syndicate”15) that make a public offering 
of the securities at a fixed price.16 The investment banks are compen-
sated by purchasing the securities at a price equal to the public offer-
                                                                                                                      
ate would be considered to beneficially own for this purpose all stock over which it had vot-
ing power or investment power, even if it had no financial interest in the stock. 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 228.403 instruction 4, 240.13d-3(a) (2005). Moreover, it includes some securities one 
does not own but merely has the contractual ability to acquire within sixty days. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i) (2005). Second, they find that when they “substitute underwriter dollar 
ownership in place of underwriter percentage ownership . . . [their] primary conclusions 
are qualitatively unchanged, though the significance of the results noticeably weakens.” Li 
& Masulis, supra note 7, at 19 (emphasis added). If issuer certification is responsible, as 
opposed to, for example, control, one would expect greater strength from investigating the 
dollar amount invested, not the percentage ownership. 
 13. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
 14. Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 272 tbl.2 (1987) 
(citing data indicating that firm commitment contracts are used in most IPOs that raise 
over $2 million). 
 15. See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 2.A.2 (3d 
ed. 2004) (discussing the historical origins of underwriting syndicates). 
 16. Id. 
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ing price minus an agreed-upon percentage commission, a commis-
sion which is typically is about seven percent.17 
 Although the investment banks typically do not have binding obli-
gations to consummate the IPO until the IPO is priced,18 the invest-
ment banks nevertheless assume some risk in the underwriting. 
There are two types of risk. First, they may overestimate the demand 
and agree to a price that is too high. That is because although they 
will have received indications of interest before the pricing, they 
cannot send out the written confirmations of sales before the securi-
ties have been priced.19 Second, the IPO typically will be priced in the 
afternoon on a particular day, with the closing scheduled to occur 
four business days later.20 There is a possibility that a market decline 
between pricing and closing may unsettle the underwriters’ ability to 
consummate resales, which necessarily cannot close before the origi-
nal placement to the underwriters closes.21 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 
1105 (2000). 
 18. See, e.g., Café La France, Inc. v. Schneider Sec., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 361, 364, 
376 (D.R.I. 2003) (granting judgment after a bench trial to an investment bank on claims 
arising from alleged failure to fulfill obligations under a letter of intent for an IPO); CARL 
W. SCHNEIDER ET AL., GOING PUBLIC: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND CONSEQUENCES 38 (2002) 
(noting letters of intent typically state they do not create binding obligations, except as to 
reimbursement of expenses). 
 19. Unless the registration statement is effective and the recipient has received a fi-
nal prospectus, a written confirmation constitutes a prospectus under section 2(a)(10) of 
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A 
(2005) (indicating that delivery of a prospectus used after a registration statement has 
been declared effective under that rule but before pricing is inadequate to make a contem-
poraneously delivered confirmation not a prospectus); Elimination of Certain Pricing 
Amendments and Revision of Prospectus Filing Procedures, Securities Act Release No. 
6714, 52 Fed. Reg. 21,252, 21,257 (June 5, 1987) (“However, use of such a prospectus [omit-
ting pricing information] is not permitted for purposes of satisfying the requirements of 
section 5(b)(2) in connection with delivery of a security for sale or for delivery after a sale 
or the requirements of section 2(10)(a) in connection with delivery of other written commu-
nications (e.g., confirmations) to investors.”). 
 20. Currently, where an IPO is priced after 4:30 p.m. on a particular business day, 
which is common, the closing is held on the fourth following business day. See Deanna L. 
Kirkpatrick, The Underwriting Agreement, in HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERING 2004, at 277, 288 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 
1450, 2004). 
 21. There are some conditions to the investment banks’ obligations that decrease this 
risk. One typical condition would be a material adverse change in the issuer’s financial 
condition between pricing and closing, a period of a few days. See generally First Boston 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78, at 152 (Sept. 2, 1985) 
(stating the position of the SEC staff that a market out may properly be a condition to con-
summation of a firm commitment underwriting, but not where it permits avoidance of the 
purchase obligation merely by virtue of an inability to market the securities); LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 15, § 2.A.2 (describing both the market-based condition and the is-
suer-specific condition as part of a “market out”). Another typical condition is a material 
adverse change in the financial markets as a whole. Id. § 2.A.2. It is rare, however, for un-
derwriters to assert this condition as a basis for not closing a securities offering. See id. 
There are some examples to the contrary, however. See, e.g., Walk-In Med. Ctrs. v. Breuer 
Capital Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming a judgment in favor of the issuer, 
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 There are a number of steps that ultimately lead to the determi-
nation of an IPO price. The initial tentative steps begin when a cor-
poration first assembles the team that will participate in its IPO, 
which occurs a number of months before the IPO is priced. It is typi-
cal for an attractive corporation to interest more than one investment 
bank in managing its IPO.22 The process in which an investment 
bank is selected to manage an IPO is frequently called a “beauty pag-
eant.”23 In making their selections, issuers compare prospective IPO 
managers on the basis of a number of criteria, including expected 
price.24 
 These price estimates are not binding; IPO prices ordinarily are 
not determined until months later.25 Typically, between the beauty 
pagent and final pricing, (1) there is a “due diligence” review of the 
issuer from accounting, legal and business perspectives;26 (2) a pre-
liminary prospectus is prepared and filed with the SEC;27 (3) the SEC 
reviews the filing; (4) the preliminary prospectus is revised to reflect 
SEC comments and information disclosed by the due diligence re-
views;28 and (5) the offering is marketed, where the investment banks 
receive indications of interest from prospective investors.29 
 Prior to the pricing, the only writing permitted to be used to offer 
the IPO securities is a preliminary prospectus,30 and in the case of an 
IPO, SEC rules require that this preliminary prospectus indicate an 
estimated price,31 which is frequently stated in the form of a price 
range. One can use the difference between the price estimate and the 
actual IPO price (the pre-IPO price adjustment) to assess the pre-
IPO performance of the underwriters. However, there are some pos-
                                                                                                                      
finding the investment bank had terminated the offering because of a decline in the is-
suer’s stock, as opposed to general market conditions); cf. Galacticomm Techs., Inc. v. First 
Equity Corp. of Fla., 751 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding an issuer ade-
quately pleaded a claim against an investment bank for breach of a firm commitment un-
derwriting agreement, reversing the trial court). 
 22. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 7. 
 23. E.g., Avital Louria Hahn, Investment Banks Continue to Hunt for Telecom Re-
search, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Jan. 10, 2000, at 10 (using the term). 
 24. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 7; Abby M. Alderman & Kenneth Y. Hao, The 
Initial Public Offering Process, in HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1995, at 
405, 411, 415 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-904, 1995). 
 25. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 18, at 7-8. 
 26. Stacy J. Kanter, Sample Timetable and Responsibility Schedule for an Initial Pub-
lic Offering of Common Stock, in HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 2004, at 9, 
23 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1459, 2004) (indicating 
business due diligence continues and legal due diligence begins in first week of sample 
timetable). 
 27. Id. at 21 (indicating filing registration statement with SEC in seventh week). 
 28. Id. (indicating estimated receipt of SEC comments and filing of a response in elev-
enth week). 
 29. Id. (indicating road show scheduled to begin in twelfth week).  
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.430(a) (2004). 
 31. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.501(a)(8), 229.501(b)(3) instruction 1 (2004). 
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sible concerns with using this statistic. For example, after the pre-
liminary filing, the issuer may decide to effect a stock split or reverse 
stock split in connection with the IPO. That would cause a price 
change, albeit one not reflecting a change in firm valuation. There 
also is some question whether this price reflects the estimate as of 
the beauty pageant or the estimate as of the time the document is 
filed or some combination of those estimates.32 Nevertheless, it is a 
statistic that has been used previously in both the legal33 and the fi-
nancial economics literature.34 Most significantly, it is a statistic 
used by Li and Masulis35 as part of their attempt to support the certi-
fication hypothesis. 
B.   Motivation for Investigating Alternative Theories 
 Assorted anecdotal evidence concerning the IPO-pricing process 
suggests certification is not the hallmark of the process. Rather, 
there is evidence that last-minute investment bank holdups are a 
significant issue. Between the selection of an investment bank to 
manage an IPO and the IPO pricing, the balance of relative negotiat-
ing power shifts in favor of the investment banks, because the issuer 
cannot feasibly change investment banks at the last minute. For ex-
ample, one pricing was described as the underwriters presenting a 
“take it or leave it” offer.36 Another story describes the problems more 
generally: “Pricing is a factor that caught many senior managers by 
surprise. By the time the pricing meeting occurs, companies typically 
are not negotiating from a position of strength.”37 Malone describes 
IPO pricing in the following way: 
The company executives, in turn, often come away from the pricing 
session embittered. Until this moment, the underwriter may have 
                                                                                                                      
 32. Some portion of the information produced by due diligence investigations will be 
identified by the time the preliminary prospectus is prepared. That information may in 
part be reflected in the price estimate disclosed in the preliminary prospectus. It is likely, 
however, that the price estimate will not fully reflect that information. If the information is 
negative, the managing investment bank has an incentive to postpone indicating it has re-
vised its price estimate downward. Early price revisions suggest the investment bank may 
have lied in the beauty pageant in order to secure the business. It is easier to attribute 
variations from the estimate to other factors after the securities have been marketed. The 
managing investment bank also has an incentive to postpone bad news, because the issuer 
becomes increasingly committed to receipt of the proceeds as time passes, limiting its abil-
ity to change plans (or its managing underwriter). 
 33. Royce de R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm Investments in 
Clients: An Empirical Assessment, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 379, 430-35 tbls.4, 5 (2002). 
 34. E.g., Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and the 
Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 242 tbl.3 (1993). 
 35. See Li & Masulis, supra note 7, at 19-22. 
 36. Robert A. Mamis, The Making of a Millionaire, INC. MAG., May 1995, at 86, avail-
able at http://www.inc.com/magazine/19950501/2264.html. 
 37. Carol Hall & Cynthia Robbins-Roth, Going Public Without Panic, RECORDER, May 
6, 1992, at 8. 
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seemed to be their greatest advocate, but now, when it is too late 
to turn back, the underwriter turns on them; indifferent to the 
company’s needs, the underwriter now takes care of its own image, 
low-balling the price to guarantee the maximum number of shares 
sold to look good in the proposal to the next sucker.38 
In one of the most vivid examples, a chief financial officer described 
the pricing process as follows: “I feel like I’ve been to a proctologist—
and he had a very cold finger.”39 This information is consistent with 
advice in practitioner guides for firms contemplating IPOs, which 
notes prospective issuers should ask previous clients about the dif-
ference between preliminary pricing and final pricing40 or last-
minute surprises.41 
 This anecdotal evidence may be inaccurate, or it may accurately 
describe pricing. The problems, however, may not be more severe 
when the investment banks have enhanced conflicts. This question, 
then, provides the motivation for the empirical investigation in this 
Article. 
 One might question whether this view of the IPO-pricing process, 
which motivates this investigation, is inconsistent with the presence 
of venture capital firms as investors in IPO firms. One might, for ex-
ample, seek to reject out of hand any assertion that investment 
banks can engage in strategic conduct because the presence of ven-
ture capital firms acting as repeat players would be knowledgeable of 
this practice and would prevent it. The presence of repeat players as 
IPO investors is not inconsistent with this view of the IPO-pricing 
process, however. If the process puts pre-IPO investors in the posi-
tion of being subject to a last-minute holdup that cannot practicably 
be avoided in the existing regulatory environment, knowledgeable 
investors would reflect the expected cost of the holdup when they 
bargain about the terms of their initial investments. 
 As discussed in the Introduction, although this Article presents a 
motivation for undertaking the empirical investigation reported be-
                                                                                                                      
 38. MICHAEL S. MALONE, GOING PUBLIC: MIPS COMPUTER AND THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL DREAM 197-98 (1991). 
 39. Robert D. Hof & Gabrielle Saveri, Inside an Internet IPO, BUS. WK., Sept. 6, 1999, 
at 60. 
 40. STEPHEN C. BLOWERS ET AL., THE ERNST & YOUNG LLP GUIDE TO THE IPO VALUE 
JOURNEY 88 (1999) (“Some questions you may wish to ask are: . . . Did the underwriters 
significantly reduce the . . . estimated selling price during the registration process?”); 
DAVID P. SUTTON & M. WILLIAM BENEDETTO, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: A STRATEGIC 
PLANNER FOR RAISING CAPITAL 97 (1988) (“Questions to ask the underwriter include the 
following: . . . How close to the preliminary pricing was the final price for other deals?”). 
 41. JAMES B. ARKEBAUER & RON SCHULTZ, GOING PUBLIC: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO 
KNOW TO TAKE YOUR COMPANY PUBLIC, INCLUDING INTERNET DIRECT PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
170 (1998) (“Some questions to ask include these: Were there any last-minute surprises?”); 
BLOWERS ET AL., supra note 40, at 88 (“Did the underwriters present any last-minute sur-
prises or demands?”). 
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low, no attempt is being made to provide a complete catalog of eco-
nomic theories that are consistent with the results. Part of the prob-
lem with creating a test that excludes all other theories is that this 
market is full of anomalies that make it difficult to create a unique, 
elegant, unifying model. 
 There is a final concern. This Article investigates the change in 
price, from an estimate to the actual price. Variations in the price 
change among IPOs can be caused by changes in either the IPO price 
or the price estimate. One might analogize this investigation to an 
examination of the time it takes some set of people to travel a certain 
distance. Their trips may be made longer by changing either their 
starting points or by changing their speeds of travel. One might as-
cribe two causes to a set of IPOs involving lower pre-IPO price ad-
justment. It might be caused either by less marketing after the 
beauty pageant or by the beauty pageant being more active, requir-
ing prospective investment banks to compete more aggressively in 
order to get the business. 
 One can conceive of circumstances in which the issuer’s attributes 
would affect the beauty pageant. For example, the issuer’s level of 
sophistication may affect the presentations made in the beauty pag-
eant. A sophisticated issuer might be expected to examine price es-
timates more critically, which could influence the price estimates 
given. For this reason, caution is required in seeking to draw defini-
tive, affirmative conclusions from the empirical analyses. Neverthe-
less, this Article formulates tests that are useful for the more limited 
role (that is, the “negative” role) of showing that the pricing relation-
ships found by Li and Masulis cannot necessarily be ascribed to certi-
fication in the form of assurance of value.  
C.   Regulation of IPO Pricing 
 The federal securities laws regulating the sales of securities are de-
scribed as “disclosure” regulation, as opposed to “merit” regulation42—
meaning that federal law does not directly regulate the prices at which 
IPO securities are sold. Rather, federal law mandates disclosure of as-
sorted information in a preliminary prospectus used before the IPO is 
priced in the final prospectus and in the registration statement.43 
                                                                                                                      
 42. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3] (5th ed. 2004). 
Where not preempted by federal law, state securities law, on the other hand, may seek to 
regulate the merits of an offering. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, § 1.B.1 (discussing the 
merit regulation component of state securities laws and the partial preemption of state 
merit regulation). This Article’s discussion of the legal framework regulating offerings re-
flects the law in effect prior to the revisions, effective December 2005, made by Securities 
Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 43. Form S-1, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 7127 (Feb. 2, 2005); Form SB-2, 2 Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 7371 (Nov. 2, 2001). Federal law requires delivery of the prospectus, then 
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 Self-regulatory organizations, which include, inter alia, the na-
tional securities exchanges and registered securities associations,44 
provide another source of regulation—a source that may regulate the 
merits of an offering. The NASD, a national securities association 
that regulates and supervises the conduct of its member brokers and 
dealers, is one form of self-regulatory organization.45 NASD rules 
seek to protect the investing public from sales of overpriced IPO se-
curities where participating investment banks have conflicts of inter-
est by requiring the stock be sold at a price no higher than “that rec-
ommended by a qualified independent underwriter.”46 
 In the late 1990s (throughout the time period of the data set stud-
ied), the conflicts of interest that triggered the requirement for a QIU 
included, inter alia:47 (1) a member participating in the distribution 
(or certain related persons) sold securities in the offering or in the 
following ninety days, unless those securities were not more than one 
percent of the securities being offered;48 (2) ten percent or more of the 
                                                                                                                      
in preliminary form, to those anticipated to purchase in the IPO, at least forty-eight hours 
before confirming sales. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b) (2004).  
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2000). 
 45. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 15, §§ 7.C.1.-.2. Rules proposed by the NASD regu-
lating its members are subject to SEC approval and abrogation. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), (c) 
(2000). 
 46. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL, R. 2720(c)(3)(A) (2001) 
[hereinafter NASD MANUAL I]. In addition to passing on the pricing, a QIU is obligated to 
“participate in the preparation of the registration statement and . . . exercise the usual 
standards of ‘due diligence’ in respect thereto.” Id. R. 2720(c)(3)(A). An investment bank 
acting as a QIU assumes the potential liability of an underwriter under 15 U.S.C. § 77k 
(2000), according to lower court authority. Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 
1392, 1403 (7th Cir. 1995) (acting as a QIU imposes underwriter liability under 15 U.S.C. § 
77k (2000), and, for purposes of the limit in 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000), a QIU is considered to 
have underwritten the entire issue). There is other authority construing the legal conse-
quences of assuming the obligations of a QIU. E.g., Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 
F.3d 617, 625 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim as to, inter 
alia, claim prospectus disclosure concerning the recommendation of a QIU was false or 
misleading); Feiner v. SS & C Techs., 11 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding a 
claim is stated by allegations arising from, inter alia, a QIU’s performance); In re Walnut 
Equip. Leasing Co., No. 97-19699DWS, 1999 WL 1271762 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1999) 
(finding indemnification claim of QIU not acting as underwriter for attorneys’ fees in de-
fending itself subordinated under 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2000)). A detailed discussion of the 
rules governing QIUs is contained in Stephen J. Schulte, Qualified Independent Under-
writers: A Primer for the Practitioner, in HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 
1997, at 463 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1008, 1997). 
 47. The circumstances listed are those that most frequently require the use of a QIU 
in the sample of IPOs studied. Other circumstances can require the use of a QIU. Rule 
2720 required the use of a QIU, inter alia, where an NASD member was assisting in the 
distribution of securities of an “affiliate.” NASD MANUAL I, supra, at R. 2720(c)(1). NASD 
member affiliates included firms that “controls, is controlled by or is under common control 
with” the member. Id. R. 2720(b)(1)(A). 
 48. Id. R. 2710(c)(7)(C). For this purpose, members participating in the distribution 
include, in addition to underwriters, other NASD members in the selling group. Id. R. 
2720(c)(1) (referencing “underwrit[ing], participat[ing] as a member of the underwriting 
syndicate or selling group, or other assist[ing] in the distribution”). 
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issuer’s common stock or a class of preferred stock or subordinated 
debt was owned by a member participating in the distribution (or 
their affiliates or associates);49 and (3) more than ten percent of the 
net offering proceeds, excluding underwriting compensation, was to 
be paid to members participating in the distribution (or their affili-
ates or associates), subject to certain exceptions.50 Of course, a 
mechanism that seeks to assure prices are not too high, as this one 
does, would normally not directly benefit issuers. 
 The interests triggering the requirement for a QIU may create 
powerful incentives. For example, the prospectus for the $100 million 
June 7, 2000, IPO of Ubiquitel Inc. involves an underwriter having a 
conflict of interest by virtue of ownership of the issuer’s preferred 
stock and subordinated debt. The prospectus discloses that an affili-
ate of the lead underwriter previously agreed to purchase $100 mil-
lion additional shares of preferred stock if the IPO did not close be-
fore July 31, 2000.51 That relationship seems likely to provide a 
strong incentive for the investment bank to close the IPO. 
 In exchange for these efforts, QIUs typically receive only modest 
compensation. For example, in the $137 million October 2000 IPO of 
Westport Resources Corporation, Credit Suisse First Boston charged 
only $10,000 to act as QIU, compared to the $9.3 million aggregate 
underwriting fee for the offering.52  
 The bursting of the internet bubble and the numerous recent cor-
porate scandals53 produced a plethora of revisions to the regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
 49. Id. Rs. 2720(b)(7), 2720(c)(1). 
 50. Id. R. 2710(c)(8) (titled “Conflict of Interest” and requiring the price be “estab-
lished pursuant to Rule 2720(c)(3)”). These rules are revised reasonably frequently. For ex-
ample, the venture capital rules, which governed sales by member investment banks (or 
related persons) in the IPO itself were eliminated in 2004. NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, 
NOTICE TO MEMBERS 04-13, 149-50 (2004); NASD MANUAL I, supra note 46, R. 2710(c)(7)(c) 
(containing the term “venture capital restrictions” as its caption) (amending Rule 2710, 
approved Dec. 23, 2003, effective Mar. 22, 2004), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/ 
groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/nasdw_003258.pdf. Instead, the rules now 
generally prevent the sale of securities acquired by underwriters and related persons 
within the 180 days before the filing of the registration statement either in the offering or 
within 180 days thereafter. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL, R. 
2710(g)(1) (2005) [hereinafter NASD MANUAL II]. For this purpose, “[u]nderwriter and 
[r]elated [p]ersons” means, “underwriter’s counsel, financial consultants and advisors, 
finders, any participating member, and any other persons related to any participating 
member.” Id. R. 2710(a)(6). 
 51. Ubiquitel Inc., Prospectus, 12,500,000 Shares of Common Stock, at 129 (June 7, 
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1108487/000091205700027832/ 
a424b4.txt. 
 52. See Westport Res. Corp., Prospectus, 9,150,000 Shares of Common Stock, at 1, 73 (Oct. 
19, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1117021/000095013400008742/ 
d77955b4e424b4.txt. 
 53. A scorecard, useful in keeping track of the numerous reprobates, has been pro-
vided by the Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company Inc., Executives on Trial: Scandal 
Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1. 
2005]                          IPO-PRICING REGULATION 449 
 
environment, an environment that remains in flux. Most important 
for purposes of this investigation are proposals for reforming the IPO 
process initiated by the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee,54 
which resulted in proposed rule changes by the NASD and the 
NYSE.55 The joint committee formulated twenty proposals for revi-
sions, which ultimately resulted in the proposed rule changes at the 
NYSE and the NASD. The SEC’s consideration of the proposals is 
currently pending.56 
 The proposals include reforms that would benefit issuers, as well 
as some designed to benefit investors. For example, one proposal re-
quires NYSE members and NASD members who are “running the 
books” of an IPO to provide regular reports of the indications of in-
terest (that is, perceived demand) during the IPO process.57 The 
NASD provides the following rationale: “[G]reater participation by 
issuers in pricing and allocation decisions would better ensure that 
those decisions are consistent with the fiduciary duty of directors and 
management, and would provide management with more information 
to evaluate the underwriter’s performance.”58 Other proposals would, 
inter alia, restrict quid pro quo allocations of IPOs,59 ban some “spin-
ning,”60 and restrict certain actions designed to combat “flipping” 
IPOs.61 
                                                                                                                      
 54. NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee, Report and Recommendations of a Com-
mittee (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/iporeport.pdf. See generally Ely R. 
Levy, The Law and Economics of IPO Favoritism and Regulatory Spin, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 
185 (2004) (discussing economic theories of IPO pricing and potential reform). 
 55. Exchange Act Release No. 50,896, supra note 3. The SEC also recently adopted 
substantial revision to the offering process generally. Securities Offering Reform, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 56. Exchange Act Release No. 50,896, supra note 3. 
 57. Id. at 77,805-06 (reproducing proposed NYSE Rule 470(D) and NASD Rule 2712(e)). 
 58. Id. at 77,811. 
 59. Id. at 77,804-05 (reproducing proposed NYSE Rule 470(A) and NASD Rule 2712(a), 
each of which would ban “offer[ing] or threaten[ing] to withhold [IPO] shares . . . as a consid-
eration or inducement for the receipt of compensation that is excessive”). 
 60. Id. at 77,804-05 (reproducing proposed NYSE Rule 470(B) and NASD Rule 2712(b)). 
“Spinning” includes “awarding IPO shares to the executive officers and directors of an in-
vestment banking client.” Id. at 77,810. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Under-
pricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Pub-
lic Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583 (2004) (providing a detailed discussion of the issues and 
some of the financial economics theory); Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public 
Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 788-89 (2005) (providing, inter alia, a criticism of the cur-
rent bookbuilding method of pricing and allocating IPO shares); Therese H. Maynard, Spin-
ning in a Hot IPO—Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2023 (2002) (analyzing various implications of spinning); Andres Rueda, The Hot IPO Phe-
nomenon and the Great Internet Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21 (2001) (discussing le-
gal issues pertinent to effecting IPO allocations in a hot market). 
 61. Exchange Act Release No. 50,896, at 77,804-05 (reproducing proposed NYSE Rule 
470(C) and NASD Rule 2712(c)). “Flipping” refers to the resale of IPO securities within 
thirty days of the IPO. Id. at 77,805. See generally Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Dis-
closure of Restrictions on Flipping IPO Securities, 74 TULANE L. REV. 883 (2000) (discuss-
ing disclosure obligations pertinent to restrictions on flipping). 
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 The empirical evidence presented in this Article is useful in 
sketching the environment in which the reform proposals would op-
erate. Assume, for example, that investment banks use their (or their 
affiliates’) control of issuers in a way that adversely affects issuers. 
In that case, requiring investment banks to provide greater disclo-
sure at the time pricing decisions are made may not be adequate. 
The information may arrive too late, unless it is made public in a 
way that companies, when they are negotiating pre-IPO financing 
with investment bank affiliates, have access to pricing information 
concerning IPOs of other firms in which those affiliates invested. 
This kind of information would be particularly useful on a compara-
tive basis, in order to allow issuers to consider it in selecting firms to 
provide pre-IPO financing. 
 Of course, a firm seeking pre-IPO financing could individually ask 
sources of capital to provide information about other transactions. 
The problem is that is not efficient. It requires duplicative inquiries 
and imposes costs as prospective issuers would need to take steps to 
assure they had received full information. 
 However, our assessment of the advantages of creating a public 
source of this information depends on the empirical results. If we 
find evidence consistent with any of these conflicts of interest not in-
fluencing pricing, one might be less concerned with facilitating the 
dissemination of comparative pricing information. 
III.   PRIOR EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 There have been numerous empirical investigations of the IPO-
pricing process—the literature is sufficiently large to have separate 
works summarizing the literature.62 Historically, there has been an 
average initial return, a return over one or a few days, somewhere 
between ten and twenty percent.63 Because very large aggregate 
sums are raised in IPOs—$488 billion, in 2001 dollars, from 1980 to 
2001 by one count64—and ten to twenty percent of these sums is also 
large, it is not surprising that this phenomenon has received a sig-
nificant amount of financial economics scholarship.  
                                                                                                                      
 62. TIM JENKINSON & ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, GOING PUBLIC: THE THEORY AND 
EVIDENCE ON HOW COMPANIES RAISE EQUITY FINANCE (2d ed. 2001) (providing a recent 
collection of theories); Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Al-
locations, 57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002) (same). 
 63. E.g., Roger G. Ibbotson et al., Initial Public Offerings, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., 
Summer 1988, at 37, 41 tbl.1 (16.4% from 1960 through 1987). At times, the market is par-
ticularly hot, producing significantly greater average initial returns. For example, 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm find average IPO returns in 1999 through 2000 to be significant, 
depending on the sample selected. Alexander Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, IPO Pric-
ing in the Dot-Com Bubble, 58 J. FIN. 723, 729 tbl.II (2003). 
 64. Ritter & Welch, supra note 62, at 1795 (in 2001 dollars). 
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 One prominent theory postulates (1) that an issuer typically has 
greater knowledge of information pertinent to assessing the firm’s 
value and (2) that investors understand they have less knowledge 
and therefore offer low prices but (3) that this effect (investors offer-
ing low prices) can be mitigated by third party “certification.”) 65 Oth-
ers have empirically tested this theory, finding lower underpricing in 
IPOs with lesser risk, such as those underwritten by high-prestige 
investment banks66 and those of issuers having venture capitalists as 
investors.67 
 The second component of IPO pricing that can be investigated 
quantitatively is the pre-IPO price adjustment. One traditional the-
ory argues the pre-IPO price adjustment reflects the level of market-
ing activity. Better investment banks are associated with more pre-
IPO activity,68 so that there is a positive relationship between abso-
lute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment and investment bank 
quality.69 
 This Article focuses on investment bank conflicts of interest in 
IPO pricing. As to that issue, other empirical work investigates the 
relationship between underpricing and each of the following: per-
centage beneficial ownership (negative, significant);70 the issuer hav-
ing a commercial bank that could (through an affiliate) have taken 
the issuer public (negative, significant);71 the presence of a common 
stock QIU (not significant);72 the presence of a proceeds QIU (nega-
                                                                                                                      
 65. William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capital Certification in Ini-
tial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879, 880 (1991). 
 66. Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter 
Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045 (1990) (finding prestigious underwriters are associated with 
lower initial returns). Contra Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal 
Liability in Initial Public Offerings, 39 J. L. & ECON. 545, 556, 588-99 (1996) (finding con-
trary results in a later period). 
 67. Megginson & Weiss, supra note 65, at 879.  Contra Peggy M. Lee & Sunil Wahal, 
Grandstanding, Certification and the Underpricing of Venture Capital Backed IPOs, 73 J. 
FIN. ECON. 375, 377 (2004) (finding contrary results when controlling for endogeneity). 
 68. Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and the Par-
tial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 241 (1993). 
 69. Id. at 242 tbl.3. 
 70. Li & Masulis, supra note 7, at 38 tbl.4, 39 tbl.5. Contra Paul Gompers & Josh 
Lerner, Conflict of Interest in the Issuance of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture 
Capital, 42 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10, 20 (1999) (“While significance levels are low, there does ap-
pear to be a monotonic relationship between venture capital/underwriter affiliation and 
underpricing. A closer relationship is associated with greater underpricing.”). 
 71. Carola Schenone, The Effect of Banking Relationships on the Firm’s IPO Under-
pricing, 59 J. FIN. 2903, 2913, 2924 tbl.VI (2004). 
 72. Royce de R. Barondes, NASD Regulation of IPO Conflicts of Interest—Does Gate-
keeping Work?, 79 TULANE L. REV. 859, 889 tbl.2 (2005). There is some related evidence 
provided by Muscarella and Vetsuypens. Chris J. Muscarella & Michael R. Vetsuypens, A 
Simple Test of Baron’s Model of IPO Underpricing, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 125, 125 (1989) (find-
ing IPOs of investment banks that participated in the distribution of their own IPO to have 
underpricing comparable to that of other IPOs). Li and Masulis say they find a similar ab-
sence of a statistically significant relationship “[w]hen a QIU indicator variable is added as 
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tive, significant);73 and the presence of a noncommon security QIU 
(negative, significant).74 The complementary investigations of pre-
IPO price adjustment, or its absolute value, are less numerous: per-
centage beneficial ownership (negative, significant);75 and percentage 
beneficial ownership relative to absolute value (negative, signifi-
cant).76 It is helpful to depict the results in tabular form, which is 
shown in Table 1.77 
TABLE 1 
PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IPO PRICING 
AND INVESTMENT BANK CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
INVESTMENT BANK CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST INVESTIGATED 
INITIAL 
RETURN 
PRE-IPO 
PRICE 
ADJUSTMENT 
|PRE-IPO 
PRICE 
ADJUSTMENT| 
Percent Common Stock Beneficial 
Ownership – – – 
Issuer Has a Relationship Bank with an 
Affiliate That Could Underwrite the IPO –   
Presence of a Common Stock QIU ~   
Presence of a Noncommon Security QIU –   
Presence of a Proceeds QIU –   
 It is readily apparent that the literature omits the corresponding 
information investigating the relationship between pre-IPO price ad-
justment, or its absolute value, and various circumstances requiring 
a QIU. This Article provides this complementary information as part 
of providing a more complete basis for reforming IPO-pricing regula-
tion. 
IV.   DATA 
 For purposes of this investigation, all common stock IPOs con-
summated from January 31, 1997, through December 1, 2000, were 
located in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database of securities 
                                                                                                                      
a new control variable.” Li & Masulis, supra note 7, at 19. The results are unreported, 
meaning they do not reproduce the full regressions, which makes it somewhat difficult to 
discuss their results. Moreover, their discussion is not entirely clear in indicating whether 
the indicator variable includes any kind of QIU, because it follows a sentence discussing 
NASD rules that require the use of a QIU for ownership of “10% or greater in an issuer’s 
debt or equity,” which omits reference to receipt of proceeds requiring a QIU, as well as 
sales in the offering by participating NASD members. 
 73. Barondes, supra note 72, at 889 tbl.2. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Li & Masulis, supra note 7, at 40 tbl.6 (particularly as to lead underwriter shares). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Relationships significant at the 10% level (or better) are indicated with a “+” or a 
“-” sign; a “~” identifies relationships that are not statistically significant. 
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offerings (a commercial database available for a fee).78 The data used 
in this investigation excludes some of those offerings reported by SDC. 
Offerings of financial companies, identified as firms having four-digit 
primary SIC codes beginning with “6” (6xxx), are excluded. That filter 
removes certain unusual offerings, for example, offerings of financing 
entities and IPOs concurrent with the demutualization of insurance 
companies. In addition, offerings have been eliminated where the pro-
spectus on file with the SEC indicates that the offering involved (1) a 
simultaneous offering of warrants or (2) some other anomaly in the of-
fering (for example, although the offering is classified by SDC as an 
IPO, the prospectus reveals the stock was trading over the counter be-
fore the offering). Lastly, the sample used excludes offerings where the 
securities could not be located in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database. The resulting sample includes 1168 offerings, 
consisting of all IPOs in that period that might be classified as “tradi-
tional” IPOs for which SDC’s and CRSP’s databases report the infor-
mation used in the models presented below.79 
 The pertinent statistics of the offerings used below are those re-
ported in the SDC database, with the following exceptions: the shares 
outstanding after the offering and whether the issuer had two or more 
classes of stock outstanding after the offering are taken from the pro-
spectuses. The first closing price for the security as well as prices for 
the NASDAQ composite index at pertinent times are taken from 
CRSP. In a few instances, the information reported by SDC is adjusted 
to reflect corrections posted on Professor Jay Ritter's web site.80 
 The SDC database does not report whether a QIU was required. To 
identify offerings involving QIUs, all prospectuses filed with the SEC 
for this period were electronically searched using Lexis. The search 
identified those that appeared to involve an IPO that referenced either 
a qualified independent underwriter or NASD Rule 2720, the rule that 
governed the use of a QIU. That review identified 59 IPOs where a 
                                                                                                                      
 78. This period was chosen because the SEC fully implemented electronic filing of 
prospectuses by U.S. issuers during 1996. Changes and Corrections to EDGAR Phase-in 
List, Securities Act Release No. 7258, 61 Fed. Reg. 2270, 2271 (Jan. 25, 1996); 17 C.F.R. § 
232.901(a)(1) (1996). Some of the information used in the regressions was hand collected 
from the SEC filings. Starting in 1997 avoids having a sample censored in a way that may 
affect the results. Starting with calendar years 1997 through 2000, the first and last thirty 
days were removed, as part of creating control variables described below, leaving a data set 
of IPOs from January 31, 1997, through December 1, 2000. See infra note 100 and accom-
panying text. 
 79. Two of the variables used in the empirical results are based on averages of certain 
statistics of all IPOs in the sample within thirty days of the particular IPO. One IPO was 
both more than thirty days before the next IPO in the sample and more than thirty days 
after the preceding IPO in the sample. For absence of a match of at least one other IPO 
within that sixty-day window, this IPO was removed from the sample, leaving a total of 
1168 IPOs. 
 80. Jay R. Ritter, IPO DATA, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2006). 
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QIU was required by virtue of ownership by participating NASD 
members (or their affiliates or associates) of 10% or more of the is-
suer’s common stock (a “common stock QIU”), 18 IPOs where 10% or 
more of the issuer’s preferred stock or subordinated debt was so held 
(a “noncommon security QIU”), and 55 IPOs where a QIU was re-
quired because more than 10% of the net proceeds was being paid to 
participating NASD members (or their affiliates or associates) (a “pro-
ceeds QIU”).81 
 Summary statistics for all 1168 IPOs and the three subsets of IPOs 
involving these conflicts of interest are presented in Table 2. The pre-
IPO adjustment in IPOs where there is a common stock QIU is similar 
to that of the full sample, with means of 9.3% and 8.9%, respectively. 
The mean of the absolute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment is also 
similar, 19.8% and 22.5%, respectively. IPOs involving the two other 
types of QIUs are dissimilar: -0.7% and -11.7% mean pre-IPO price ad-
justment where there is a proceeds QIU and a noncommon security 
QIU, respectively. Interestingly, the mean of the absolute value of the 
pre-IPO price adjustment seems dissimilar from the full sample only 
for the subsample involving proceeds QIUs, 12.9%, compared to 19.7% 
for noncommon security QIUs and 22.5% for the full sample. 
 These summary statistics, then, provide an initial sense that there 
are material differences in the IPO-pricing process among the full 
sample and the three subsamples. One cannot, of course, firmly con-
clude that it is the pricing process that varies among these subsamples 
based on the summary statistics. The variation among subsample sta-
tistics may be produced by differences in the firm-specific attributes 
among the subsamples, not by differences in the pricing process. Most 
prominently, as indicated in Table 2, only 38% of the IPOs involving a 
proceeds QIU are classisfied by SDC as involving a high technology is-
suer, compared to 70% of the full sample and 61% of each of the IPOs 
involving common stock QIUs and IPOs involving noncommon security 
QIUs. The average IPO size is much larger for IPOs involving proceeds 
QIUs ($161 million), common stock QIUs ($116 million) and noncom-
mon security QIUs ($124 million) than in the sample as a whole ($86 
million). Variations in each of these other statistics could account for 
differences in pre-IPO price adjustment in the subsample, meaning 
that it might be the variation in the characteristics of the IPOs involv-
ing QIUs, as opposed the related party interests themselves, that ac-
counts for differences in pre-IPO price adjustment. For this reason, al-
ternative techniques, such as multiple regression, are required to as-
sess the relationship between pre-IPO price adjustment and the pres-
ence of a conflict of interest. 
                                                                                                                      
 81. The elimination of the first thirty days of 1997 and the last thirty days of 2000 
changes only the first number, and only from 60 to 59. 
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V.   EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS 
A.   Estimation Techniques 
 Two techniques were used to examine the relationship between 
pre-IPO price adjustment and QIUs: multiple regression and estima-
tion of the average effect of the treatment using propensity score 
matching. Each technique involves assembling a set of control vari-
ables predicted to be associated with the variable of interest, pre-IPO 
price adjustment.  
 The multiple regression technique involves estimating the follow-
ing two relationships: 
(1) pre-IPO price adjustment (percentage) = β0 + β1 control vari-
able1 + . . . + βn control variablen + βn+1 proceeds QIU + βn+2 
common stock QIU + βn+3 noncommon security QIU + ε. 
(2) abs (pre-IPO price adjustment (percentage)) = β0 + β1 control 
variable1 + . . . + βn control variablen + βn+1 proceeds QIU + 
βn+2 common stock QIU + βn+3 noncommon security QIU + ε. 
 The second technique is somewhat less familiar. The basic concern 
is the following: various control variables may be associated with a 
change in the likelihood that there is a QIU. For example, IPOs of 
firms with greater pre-IPO assets may be more likely to have a con-
flict requiring a QIU, because those firms may be more likely to need 
substantial pre-IPO financing. That creates what is called “endogene-
ity,” which may affect the validity of the ordinary least squares re-
gressions.82 Programs written for Stata statistical software provide 
an alternative technique.83 Applying the technique to this data in-
volves two steps. In the first step, the programs estimate the rela-
tionship (likelihood) between a particular conflict requiring a QIU 
and various control variables to produce “propensity scores,” mean-
ing, in this case, the likelihood that a particular offering will involve 
a QIU for one of these circumstances.84 For this investigation, there 
need to be three estimations of propensity scores, one for each of the 
three circumstances requiring a QIU. In the second step, which is 
again performed three times (once for each of the three circum-
stances requiring a QIU), observations involving a QIU are matched 
with other observations not involving a QIU for that reason, on the 
basis of propensity scores. The program then estimates the average 
                                                                                                                      
 82. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND 
PANEL DATA 50-51 (2001). 
 83. See generally Sascha O. Becker & Andrea Ichino, Estimation of Average Treatment 
Effects Based on Propensity Scores, 2 STATA J. 358 (2002) (discussing the programs). 
 84. See, e.g., WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 82, at 620-21 (discussing propensity scores); 
Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Obser-
vational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983).  
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effect of the treatment—each of the three circumstances requiring a 
QIU being what is termed a “treatment”—on the treated (called the 
“ATT”) and the standard error of that estimate. As the authors of the 
program note, however, “[The] programs . . . only allow [one] to re-
duce, and not eliminate, the bias generated by unobservable con-
founding factors. . . . [T]he bias is eliminated only if the exposure to 
treatment can be considered to be purely random among individuals 
who have the same value of the propensity score.”85 
 The programs provide a number of ways to match observations 
based on propensity scores. The results in this Article are based on 
kernel matching, in which “all treated are matched with a weighted 
average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to 
the distance between the propensity scores of treated and controls.”86 
 The propensity scores were generated by probit models. The tech-
nique calls for first stratifying the sample based on the propensity for 
the presence of the treatment being estimated and confirming within 
each stratum that the means of the control variables are balanced.87 
B.   Control Variables 
 Because there is a substantial amount of existing empirical litera-
ture addressing the IPO process, one can look to those prior investi-
gations for guidance in selecting an appropriate set of control vari-
ables. 
 Use of a size variable is common in the literature.88 One reason is 
that larger offerings may attract greater interest in the beauty pag-
eants, which could affect competition in the setting of the prelimi-
nary price estimates. The size used in the estimations is the esti-
                                                                                                                      
 85. Becker & Ichino, supra note 83, at 358. 
 86. Id. at 361 (emphasis removed). In order to satisfy the balancing property, the in-
dependent variables vary slightly between estimations of the pre-IPO price adjustment 
and the absolute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment. See infra note 87 and accompany-
ing text.  The results reported are based on limiting observations not involving the treat-
ment to the area of “common support,” meaning having a propensity of having the treat-
ment within the range of propensities of observations having the treatment. Becker & 
Ichino, supra note 83, at 360. 
 87. See Becker & Ichino, supra note 83, at 359-60 (discussing the balancing require-
ment). Two of the control variables included in the models reflect changes in other securi-
ties prices. In models estimating absolute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment, the abso-
lute values of those variables are used. This slight change ultimately requires addition of 
one more variable in the estimation of the propensities of the three types of QIUs in models 
used to assess the pre-IPO price adjustment. For this purpose, the square of one variable 
was included in the estimation of the pre-IPO price adjustment, but not the absolute value 
of the pre-IPO price adjustment. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 88. E.g., Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter 
Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1057 (1990); Megginson & Weiss, supra note 65, at 896. 
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mated offer size at the time the IPO is initially filed, as opposed to 
the actual offer size.89  
 Controlling for the reputation of the investment bank is com-
mon.90 Loughran and Ritter provide rankings of investment bank 
quality91—a ranking that is commonly used in the IPO literature.92 
On this scale, the highest rank is 9.1.93 For each offering, the rank of 
the underwriter “running the books” (the managing underwriter or 
the lead manager) was identified, based on the Loughran and Ritter 
rankings.94 The relationship between price adjustment and this par-
ticular measure of prestige may be nonlinear. In the estimation of 
the pre-IPO price adjustment (but not the absolute value of that ad-
justment), the square of this ranking is also used. Use of this addi-
tional variable in that estimation produces propensity scores that 
satisfy the balancing property, and for purposes of comparison, it is 
helpful to have the same control variables in the regressions and the 
ATT estimations. 
 The quality of the issuer’s stockholders may be related to the so-
phistication of the issuer and how the beauty pageant progresses. 
The presence or absence of venture capital backing, which has been 
previously used in the IPO literature,95 is one factor that may evi-
dence issuer sophistication. The SDC database identifies IPOs of is-
suers that SDC classifies as having venture backing. A dummy vari-
able that reflects SDC’s classification of the issuer as venture backed 
is therefore used. 
 The percentage of the offering retained by pre-IPO shareholders 
may reflect private information concerning the quality of the firm.96 
Alternatively, it may affect the willingness of stockholders to accept 
                                                                                                                      
 89. As Hansen notes, use of the actual size raises econometric concerns, because the 
size adjusts in proportion to price, which is a component of the variable that is being pre-
dicted. Estimated size is used to eliminate that concern. Robert S. Hansen, Do Investment 
Banks Compete in IPOs?: The Advent of the “7% Plus Contract,” 59 J. FIN. ECON. 313, 339 
(2001).  
 90. E.g., Megginson & Weiss, supra note 65, at 897. 
 91. Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO 
Underwriters 1980-2004, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.pdf (providing data used in 
Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Has Underpricing Changed over Time?, FIN. MGMT., 
Autumn 2004, at 5 [hereinafter, Loughran & Ritter, Changed over Time]) and updating 
rankings provided in Carter & Manaster, supra note 88). 
 92. E.g., Li & Masulis, supra note 7; cf. Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputa-
tion, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285, 285 
(1998) (finding more explanatory power with their measure compared to others). 
 93. Loughran & Ritter, Changed over Time, supra note 91, at 35. 
 94. On rare occasions, more than one underwriter may be so identified. In those cases, 
the average rank was assigned.  
 95. Megginson & Weiss, supra note 65, at 897. 
 96. See Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial 
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977) (“[T]he entrepreneur’s will-
ingness to invest in his own project can serve as a signal of project quality.”). 
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price deviations. For this reason, the models include a control vari-
able—retain—which is designed to reflect the percentage of the is-
suer retained by the pre-IPO shareholders. The precise definition of 
this variable is somewhat complex. The regressions could, but do not, 
use for this purpose the following fraction:  
 IPOtheaftergoutstandinshares
IPOtheinofferedshares - IPOtheaftergoutstandinshares . 
Use of that variable would be problematic for the same reason that 
the regressions use the estimated size instead of the actual IPO 
size.97 The number of shares offered may be influenced by the final 
price, and it is improper to use a variable influenced by the depend-
ent variable (the price) as an independent variable. The solution is to 
adjust the variable to reflect the value that fraction was anticipated 
to be at the time the preliminary prospectus was filed. To make that 
computation, two substitutions are made. First, the shares expected 
to be outstanding after the IPO (based on the preliminary prospec-
tus) are substituted for the actual number shares outstanding after 
the IPO. Second, the number of shares the preliminary filing indi-
cates were to be offered is substituted for the final number of shares 
offered. Thus, the variable retain equals:98  
 IPOtheaftergoutstandinbetoexpectedshares
IPOtheinofferedbetoexpectedshares - IPOtheaftergoutstandinbetoexpectedshares . 
 Some issuers have two classes of common stock. The variable re-
tain is not comparable between issuers that do not have two classes 
of common stock and those that do. A dummy variable dual class con-
trols for variation in retain arising where the existence of a second 
class of common stock would cause the variable retain to overstate 
percentage ownership. 
 The natural logarithm of the issuer’s total assets before the offer-
ing, expressed in millions of dollars, is also included as a control 
variable. This variable is included because it is hypothesized that it 
may affect the likelihood that there will be a QIU (not because of a 
direct impact on pre-IPO price adjustment). The financing needs of 
larger firms before an IPO may be greater. Firms with more pre-IPO 
assets may therefore be more likely to obtain financing from affili-
ates of investment banks that, for example, are ultimately repaid in 
an IPO.  
 To account for technology stocks being “hot” during the period, a 
dummy variable reflecting the participation of a high technology is-
suer is included. This variable is taken from the SDC database and 
                                                                                                                      
 97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 98. The shares outstanding after the offering were taken from the prospectuses. The 
expected shares to be outstanding were computed by subtracting the shares actually of-
fered and adding the shares initially registered. 
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equals one where SDC classifies the issuer in one or more high tech-
nology areas. 
 In half the estimations, the percentage change, expressed as a 
decimal, in the NASDAQ Composite Index over the time the offer 
was in registration is used to control for changes in the market as a 
whole.99 For models estimating the absolute value of the pre-IPO 
price adjustment, the absolute value of this change in the NASDAQ 
Composite Index is used instead. 
 Two other variables control for temporal changes in pre-IPO price 
adjustment. First, the models also include a dummy variable reflect-
ing offerings in 1999 and 2000 (the bubble period). Second, half the 
estimations include the average pre-IPO price adjustment of all other 
IPOs within thirty days (before or after) of the IPO in question. The 
other estimations, those where the absolute value of the pre-IPO 
price adjustment is being estimated, include the absolute value of the 
average pre-IPO price adjustment over the corresponding sixty day 
period.100 
 The estimates also include the number of days the offering is in 
registration, that is, the time between the first filing with the SEC 
reported by SDC and the date of the IPO. This variable is not com-
monly used in financial economics literature, yet there are good rea-
sons to believe this variable is important. For example, if the SEC 
asks difficult questions during its review, it may take longer to sat-
isfy the SEC that the disclosure is accurate. This variable therefore 
may be a proxy for problems the issuer’s offering presents. 
 In the estimation of the ATTs through propensity score matching, 
these control variables are used as independent variables in estimat-
ing the propensities of there being a proceeds QIU, a common stock 
QIU, and a noncommon security QIU with probit models. Thus, there 
are six probit models. There are, for example, two for estimating the 
probability that there will be a proceeds QIU: one includes under-
writer reputation2, the NASDAQ change, and the average pre-IPO 
price adjustment of other IPOs within 30 days; and the other in-
cludes the absolute value of the NASDAQ change and the absolute 
value of the average pre-IPO price adjustment of other IPOs within 
thirty days. Similarly, there are two probit models for estimating the 
probability that there will be a common stock QIU and two probit 
models for estimating the probability that there will be a noncommon 
security QIU. 
                                                                                                                      
 99. In particular, this variable represents the percentage change, expressed as a 
decimal, from the last closing reported price reported on or before the filing date reported 
by SDC to the last closing price on or before the IPO date reported by SDC. 
 100. To be clear, it is the absolute value of the average, and not the average of the ab-
solute values, that is used. 
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 The ordinary least squares regressions add four dummy variables 
to the independent variables used in the estimation of ATTs through 
propensity score matching. The additional variables include one re-
flecting each of the three types of interest referenced above requiring 
the use of a QIU, and a fourth variable indicating whether an NASD 
member with a conflict is acting as lead manager in the offering.101 
These two regression models are represented in the following equa-
tions: 
(1) pre-IPO price adjustment (percentage) = β0 + β1 ln (est. size) 
+ β2 underwriter reputation + β3 underwriter reputation2 + β4 
NASDAQ return from the filing of the registration statement 
to the IPO date (percentage expressed as a decimal) + β5 
mean pre-IPO price adjustment of all other IPOs within 30 
days (expressed as a percentage) + β6 venture backed + β7 re-
tain + β8 dual class + β9 high tech + β10 bubble period (1999–
2000) + β11 ln (total assets before IPO, in millions) + β12 days 
in registration + β13 proceeds QIU + β14 common stock QIU + 
β15 noncommon security QIU + β16 affiliate is lead + ε. 
(2) abs (pre-IPO price adjustment (percentage)) = β0 + β1 ln (est. 
size) + β2 underwriter reputation + β3 abs(NASDAQ return 
from the filing of the registration statement to the IPO date 
(percentage expressed as a decimal)) + β4 abs (mean pre-IPO 
price adjustment of all other IPOs within 30 days (expressed 
as a percentage)) + β5 venture backed + β6 retain + β7 dual 
class + β8 high tech + β9 bubble period (1999–2000) + β10 ln 
(total assets before IPO, in millions) + β11 days in registra-
tion + β12 proceeds QIU + β13 common QIU + β14 noncommon 
security QIU + β15 affiliate is lead + ε. 
 In addition, results from the first-listed model excluding the un-
derwriter reputation2 variable are included, for purposes of showing 
that the results of interest in the regression are not materially af-
fected by using that additional variable. The results of these regres-
sions are presented in Table 3. Table 4 presents the results of the six 
estimations of the ATTs through propensity score matching. 
C.   Results 
 The results of the ordinary least squares regressions and the es-
timation of the ATTs through propensity score matching are qualita-
tively similar. There is a negative, statistically significant relation-
ship between pre-IPO price adjustment and both a proceeds QIU and 
a noncommon security QIU. The relationship between pre-IPO price 
adjustment and a common stock QIU is not statistically significant. 
                                                                                                                      
 101. The prospectuses sometimes do not identify the investment bank with a conflict of 
interest. In some cases, the information could not be discovered from other SEC filings. 
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Equality of the coefficients for proceeds QIU and common stock QIU 
is rejected with p-values 0.058 and 0.045 in models 1 and 2, respec-
tively. There is a negative, statistically significant relationship be-
tween absolute value of the pre-IPO price adjustment and a proceeds 
QIU, with the relationships for the two other types of QIUs not sta-
tistically significant. However, we cannot reject equality of the coeffi-
cients for common stock QIU and proceeds QIU at customary levels 
(p-value of 0.133).102 
 These results do not comfortably support the certification hy-
pothesis. Investment bank exit from a financial relationship with a 
private firm does not implicitly certify the issuer. If anything, it does 
the converse. Nevertheless, the kind of pre-IPO price adjustment 
that Li and Masulis find for large percentage common stock owner-
ship, which they ascribe to certification,103 is found for investment 
bank exit. 
 Lastly, one might be interested in comparing the estimated im-
pacts of the relationships Li and Masulis find for beneficial owner-
ship of common stock and the relationships found in this Article for 
receipt of a percentage of the proceeds. Their discussion argues in 
support of the economic significance of some results they find by mul-
tiplying an estimated coefficient by the average underwriter percent-
age common stock ownership in IPOs where there is any underwriter 
stock ownership.104 One can thus try to extend their methodology to 
                                                                                                                      
 102. It is possible that pertinent information about the quality of managing underwrit-
ers that affects the IPO pricing process is not captured in the underwriter reputation 
measure. To investigate whether that is the case, fixed effects models, sometimes called 
LSDV (least squares dummy variable) models, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS 616 (3d ed. 1997), were also prepared. These substitute dummy variables for the 
participation of each of the managing underwriters. Where the regression includes a con-
stant, a dummy variable reflecting the participation of one investment bank must be omit-
ted. See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 504 (3d ed. 1995). During the course 
of the sample, some investment banks who acted as lead underwriters merged. In prepar-
ing the dummy variables, all predecessors where there was at least some commonality in 
the names were treated as the same firm. Consider, for example, the merger of an invest-
ment bank named A B, Inc., with a second bank named C D, Inc. If the successor is named 
A C, Inc., IPOs are treated as having the same lead manager where the lead manager is A 
B, Inc., C D, Inc., or A C, Inc. If the successor is named A B, Inc., however, IPOs having A 
B, Inc. and C D, Inc., as lead managers are treated as being managed by different firms. 
This procedure produces 130 separate dummy variables. 
 To account for the offerings with two investment banks identified as the “lead manager,” 
the IPO was treated as being managed by the first-listed firm. The results of these models 
were, in general, qualitatively similar. Estimating pre-IPO price adjustment, the estimated 
coefficients [t-statistics] were -5.614 [1.853], 2.938 [0.609], and -17.582 [2.977] for a pro-
ceeds QIU, a common stock QIU and a noncommon security QIU, respectively. The corre-
sponding coefficient estimates for estimating the absolute value of the pre-IPO price ad-
justment were -6.678 [2.904], 1.775 [0.424], and -5.357 [1.067], respectively, the last esti-
mate being perhaps somewhat dissimilar to the results in Table 3. 
 103. Li & Masulis, supra note 7, at 21. 
 104. Id. at 12. 
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compare the magnitude of the relationship they estimate to the mag-
nitude of the relationships the results in this Article find. 
 In IPOs in Li and Masulis’s sample where the lead underwriters 
own common stock of the issuer, the average common stock owner-
ship percentage of the lead underwriters is 10.4%.105 Their estimated 
coefficient for pre-IPO price adjustment for lead underwriter per-
centage ownership is -0.22.106 Multiplying that coefficient by 10.4% 
yields an estimated -2.3% (that is, -2.3 percentage points) pre-IPO 
price adjustment. In sum, they estimate a -2.3% lower pre-IPO price 
adjustment in IPOs where the lead underwriter has common stock 
ownership equal to the average ownership in IPOs where there is a 
nonzero lead underwriter ownership. 
 On the other hand, the regression results in Table 3 show the re-
ceipt of proceeds is associated with an estimated change in pre-IPO 
price adjustment of -6.2 percentage points or -7.3 percentage 
points,107 while estimation of the ATT through propensity score 
matching shows a -10.6 percentage points decrease. Using their pro-
cedure, only a relatively large lead underwriter ownership of 28% or 
48% would correspond, respectively, to a -6.2 percentage point or a 
-10.6 percentage point change in pre-IPO price adjustment. 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Id. at 36 tbl.2. There is some ambiguity in the way they present these statistics. 
This statistic is in a portion of a table captioned “Panel B. Summary Statistics of IPOs with 
Underwriter Ownership.” Underneath this caption are row headings titled “Shareholdings 
of All Underwriters,” “Shareholdings of Lead Underwriters,” “Shareholdings of Nonlead 
Underwriters,” and “Warrant Holdings of Lead Underwriters.” The percentages are 11.0%, 
10.4%, 8.4%, and 5.0%, respectively. If these percentages were “[s]ummary [s]tatistics of 
IPOs with [u]nderwriter [o]wnership,” one might expect the second and third percentages 
to sum to the first percentage. From reviewing the annual breakdowns they provide, it ap-
pears that the 10.4% represents shareholdings of lead underwriters of IPOs with lead un-
derwriter ownership.  
 One general problem with computing percentages using beneficial percentage ownership 
figures is that, the way the SEC rules work, the percentage ownership in each IPO can add 
up to more than 100%. That is because each holder’s percentage is a fraction whose nu-
merator is the number of shares the holder owns or can acquire, and the denominator is 
the number of shares outstanding plus the number of shares the particular holder can ac-
quire. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i) (2005). 
 106. Li & Masulis, supra note 7, at 40 tbl.6. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient 
for nonlead underwriter percentage ownership is lower, -0.15. 
 107. See supra Table 2, models 1 and 2. 
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TABLE 3 
REGRESSION RESULTS108 
VARIABLES (1) PRE-IPO ADJ (%) 
(2) PRE-IPO 
ADJ (%) 
(3) |PRE-IPO 
ADJ (%)| 
constant 48.077 75.112 14.519 
 [1.442] [2.197]** [0.517] 
ln(est. size) -5.096 -4.903 -1.489 
 [2.592]*** [2.495]** [0.912] 
underwriter reputation 3.203 -7.999 1.037 
 [5.139]*** [3.331]*** [2.089]** 
underwriter reputation2  0.926  
  [4.800]***  
NASDAQ pre-IPO Return (decimal) 20.166 20.514  
 [2.008]** [2.044]**  
average of others’ pre-IPO +/- 30 days (%) 0.869 0.880  
 [6.979]*** [7.112]***  
| NASDAQ pre-IPO return (decimal) |   4.631 
   [0.445] 
| average of others’ pre-IPO +/- 30 days (%) |   0.582 
   [5.397]*** 
venture backed 2.113 2.181 3.449 
 [1.148] [1.198] [2.239]** 
retain 22.700 21.226 19.621 
 [3.072]*** [2.901]*** [3.527]*** 
dual class 6.706 5.261 5.409 
 [1.769]* [1.380] [2.118]** 
high tech 4.501 4.208 4.328 
 [2.161]** [2.033]** [2.809]*** 
bubble period -3.806 -4.633 -1.108 
 [1.242] [1.543] [0.572] 
ln (total assets before IPO (millions)) 0.773 0.505 -0.358 
 [0.855] [0.550] [0.486] 
days in registration -0.047 -0.047 0.011 
 [2.433]** [2.472]** [0.783] 
proceeds QIU -6.232 -7.340 -6.461 
 [2.111]** [2.514]** [2.994]*** 
common stock QIU 3.815 3.188 -0.199 
 [0.841] [0.710] [0.052] 
noncommon security QIU  -14.865 -15.390 0.801 
 [2.456]** [2.523]** [0.189] 
affiliate is lead -2.476 -1.837 -0.544 
 [0.612] [0.460] [0.193] 
Observations 1168.00 1168.00 1168.00 
R-squared 0.261 0.272 0.140 
                                                                                                                      
 108. Ordinary least squares estimation of relationship between pre-IPO price adjust-
ment (percent) or absolute value pre-IPO price adjustment and the following interest re-
quiring the use of a QIU: participation of NASD members (or affiliates) receiving more 
than 10% of the net proceeds, participation of NASD members (or affiliates) owning 10% or 
more of the issuer’s common stock, and participation of NASD members (or affiliates) own-
ing 10% or more of the issuer’s preferred stock or subordinated debt. The sample comprises 
1168 IPOs of nonfinancial firms from Jan. 31, 1997, through Dec. 1, 2000. In brackets be-
low estimated coefficients are t-statistics computed using Huber-White robust standard er-
rors. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are shown by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
ATT ESTIMATION109 
  NO. OF OBS. 
NO. OF 
CONTROLS ATT 
t-
STATISTIC 
Pre-IPO Price Adjustment (%)     
Proceeds QIU  55  604 -10.608 -3.406*** 
Common Stock QIU 59  1060    0.868  0.190 
Noncommon Security QIU  18  945 -18.499 -3.245*** 
     
Abs. Pre-IPO Price Adjustment (%)     
Proceeds QIU 55  619 -7.477 -3.077*** 
Common Stock QIU 59  1066 -2.063 -0.590 
Noncommon Security QIU 18  1108 -2.392 -0.572 
 It is probably easy to make too much of these comparisons. The 
models cannot predict coefficients with sufficiently small confidence 
intervals to give substantial precision to this kind of comparison. 
Moreover, the models have different control variables and, in one 
case, modeling techniques, which further complicates any compari-
son. The best that may be said with confidence is that the results 
give us no reason to believe the impact of percentage underwriter 
share beneficial ownership dominates the impact of receipt of pro-
ceeds, and there is some suggestion of the converse.  
 It is helpful to place the results of this investigation in the context 
of other literature. Table 1 is reproduced below, supplemented with 
                                                                                                                      
 109.  Estimation of ATT on percentage pre-IPO price adjustment and absolute value of 
pre-IPO price adjustment through propensity score matching, using kernel matching. 
Treatments consists of (1) QIU for participation of NASD members (or affiliates) receiving 
more than 10% of the net proceeds; (2) QIU for participation of NASD members (or affili-
ates) owning 10% or more of the issuer’s common stock; and (3) QIU for participation of 
NASD members (or affiliates) owning 10% or more of the issuer’s preferred stock or subor-
dinated debt. 
 Propensity scores for estimating ATTs for pre-IPO price adjustment are estimated with 
three probit models, each estimating the likelihood of one of the three interests requiring a 
QIU and having the following independent variables: ln(est. size); underwriter reputation; 
underwriter reputation2; venture backed; retain; dual class; high tech; bubble period; ln 
(total assets before IPO (millions)); days in registration; average percentage pre-IPO price 
adjustment of all other IPOs priced within 30 days of the IPO; and the percentage change 
in the NASDAQ from filing to the last close before the IPO date (expressed as a decimal). 
 Propensity scores for estimating ATTs for absolute value of pre-IPO price adjustment 
are estimated with three probit models, each estimating the likelihood of one of the three 
interests requiring a QIU and having the following independent variables: ln(est. size); 
underwriter reputation; venture backed; retain; dual class; high tech; bubble period; ln (to-
tal assets before IPO (millions)); days in registration; the absolute value of the average per-
centage pre-IPO price adjustment of all other IPOs priced within 30 days of the IPO; and 
the absolute value percentage change in the NASDAQ from filing to the last close before 
the IPO date (expressed as a decimal). 
 Following ATTs are t-statistics, computed using bootstrapped standard errors (200 repe-
titions). Estimations limited to areas of common support. Significance at the 1% level 
shown by ***. 
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the results of this investigation and the results from other work of 
the author.110 
TABLE 5 
COLLECTED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IPO PRICING AND INVESTMENT 
BANK CONFLICTS OF INTEREST111 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
INVESTIGATED 
INITIAL 
RETURN 
PRE-IPO 
PRICE 
ADJUST-
MENT 
| PRE-
IPO 
PRICE 
ADJUST-
MENT | 
INITIAL 
RETURN 
AT LEAST 
25% 
UNDER-
PRICING  
STRATUM –  
PRE-IPO 
ADJUSTMENT 
STRATUM 
Percentage Common 
Stock Beneficial Owner-
ship 
– – –   
Issuer Has a Relationship 
Bank with an Affiliate 
That Could Underwrite 
the IPO 
–     
Presence of a Common 
Stock QIU ~ 
~          
 This 
Article 
~           
This 
Article 
+ + 
Presence of a Noncommon 
Security QIU – 
–           
This 
Article 
~           
This  
Article 
~ ~ 
Presence of a Proceeds 
QIU – 
–           
This 
Article 
–           
This 
Article 
– ~ 
 Prior work of others112 would suggest that, in IPO pricing, large 
investment bank percentage beneficial ownership produces results 
similar to that based on the existence of other contractual pre-IPO 
relationships between issuers and investment banks. Others have 
asserted each represents certification, as Li and Masulis and Sche-
none argue is the case as to large common stock beneficial owner-
ship113 and the presence of a pre-IPO credit relationship,114 respec-
tively. Table 5 illuminates reasons to be concerned with that conclu-
sion. 
 First, it is not clear why, if certification accounts for the results, 
that these noncommon investments would have results similar in 
only some respects to large percentage beneficial ownership of com-
mon stock (other than the absence of a significant relationship not 
                                                                                                                      
 110. Barondes, supra note 72. 
 111. Tabular representation of the results of recent investigations of various conflicts 
of interest and IPO pricing statistics. Relationships significant at the 10% level are indi-
cated with a “+” or a “–” sign; a “~” identifies relationships that are not statistically signifi-
cant. Those presented in this Article are identified with “This Article.”  
 112. See Li & Masulis, supra note 7; see also Schenone, supra note 71. 
 113. Li & Masulis, supra note 7, at 1.  
 114. Schenone, supra note 71, at 2903 (ascribing the results to the relationship “ame-
liorat[ing] asymmetric information problems”). 
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proving the absence of a relationship). Second, the concern with at-
tributing certification to common stock investments and pre-IPO 
debt relationships is reaffirmed by looking at the last two columns. 
Other work shows a positive relationship between the presence of a 
common stock QIU and the likelihood there will be an initial return 
of at least 25% (a large initial return)115 and the underpricing stra-
tum minus the pre-IPO adjustment stratum.116 This second statistic 
can be defined by example. If an IPO is in the first (lowest) quartile 
of IPOs in pre-IPO price adjustment and the second (second-lowest) 
quartile in underpricing, this second statistic equals 1.0. So, the sta-
tistic reflects how the parties split the difference in value between 
the initial estimate and the post-IPO market price. The second sta-
tistic (difference in strata) is not significant for noncommon security 
QIU or for a proceeds QIU, but there is a significant and negative re-
lationship between a proceeds QIU and the variable reflecting a large 
initial return is significant but negative. If certification accounts for 
the other results, that does not explain why there are different signs 
for the likelihood of a large initial return.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Current financial economics literature conceptualizes investment 
bank conflicts of interest as playing a certification role in IPO pric-
ing. In light of the persistent investment bank malfeasance in the 
IPO process, that conclusion is puzzling. Were it accurate, those re-
sults would support focusing any regulatory reform of the IPO proc-
ess on offerings involving low-quality investment banks. 
 This Article examines those conclusions, presenting new empirical 
evidence concerning the pre-IPO price adjustment process. IPOs 
where more than ten percent of the proceeds are being paid to par-
ticipating NASD members involve relatively lower pre-IPO price ad-
justment. There is also a negative relationship for the absolute value 
of that adjustment. The relationships others suggest support certifi-
cation also exist in a context that is difficult to categorize as involv-
ing certification. 
 The conclusion that these IPOs do not involve certification pro-
vides support for pending proposals to require greater disclosure to 
issuers of the level of pre-IPO interest.117 However, it is not clear that 
proposal goes far enough. Addressing concerns that conflicts of inter-
est influence investment bank performance would require either di-
rect regulation of the pricing itself or increased public disclosure of 
information that would enhance the ability of market forces to re-
                                                                                                                      
 115. Barondes, supra note 72, at 890 tbl.3. 
 116. Id. at 896 tbl.6.  
 117. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
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strain opportunistic behavior. Enhanced disclosure could address 
pre-IPO demand, beauty pageant estimates, or details of a conflict of 
interest requiring use of a QIU beyond those currently required to be 
disclosed.118 
                                                                                                                      
 118. Rule 2720 sets forth the following disclosure requirement: 
All offerings included within the scope of this Rule shall disclose . . . that the 
offering is being made pursuant to the provisions of this Rule, that the offering 
is either being made by a member of its own securities or those of an affiliate, 
or those of a company in which the member or its associated persons, parent or 
affiliates own the common stock, preferred stock or subordinated debt of the 
company, the name of the member acting as qualified independent under-
writer, if any, and that such member is assuming the responsibilities of acting 
as a qualified independent underwriter in pricing the offering and conducting 
due diligence. 
NASD MANUAL II, supra note 50, at R. 2720(d)(2).  
